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Abstract 
In April 2002 Jobcentre Plus started to operate in the UK bringing together the 
service of the Benefits Agency and the Employment Service. Offering a fully 
integrated benefit claiming and work placement/job-seeking service for people 
of working age this new organisation aims to strengthen the link between 
welfare and work. Due to the magnitude of the associated organisational 
change, the national roll-out of the new organisation is being implemented 
gradually over a transitional period ending in 2006. During this transitional 
period some local offices are fully integrated while others functions remain split 
between pre-existing Benefits Agency and Employment Service offices. In this 
paper we examine how changes in the level of integration (measured as the 
percentage of offices within districts offering the integrated Jobcentre Plus 
service) within districts over time affected performance with respect to job 
entry, benefit service and customer service delivery. Our analysis suggests that 
Jobcentre Plus has a clear positive effect on job entry outcomes for all client 
groups, a negative effect on business delivery while it has neither a positive nor 
a negative effect on customer service outcomes.  
 
JEL classification: I38 
Keywords: Jobcentre Plus, welfare-to-work, non-jobseekers, policy evaluation.   
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Introduction  
Welfare systems throughout Europe and other OECD countries face significant 
pressures (Finn, 2000). The main contributing factor for this situation has been 
the increase in the number of people of working age who are dependent on 
benefits (such as lone parents and the sick and disabled people). Faced with 
increases in the number of benefit recipients and growing costs of their social 
assistance and unemployment compensation systems, governments in many 
countries introduced radical reforms to increase sustainable levels of 
employment. A major reform strategy in many countries has been the 
introduction of “welfare-to-work” policies (or activation policies as are 
alternatively known). In general these policies transform the social security 
systems from simply providing income replacement cash benefits towards 
combining this form of provision with training, job search and/or work (OECD, 
2003). The main aim of these policies is to create active benefit systems which 
improve employability, reinforce work incentives and reduce costs and welfare 
dependency (Finn, 2000).  
 
Traditionally “activation” policies have been applied to working age 
unemployed people (i.e. to those available for and seeking work). However, 
faced with the financial pressure caused by the increasing number of inactive 
benefit claimants, some countries have introduced policies which expanded the 
number of groups targeted by activation policies (Gilbert, 1992; Gilbert, 2002; 
Lorentzen, and Dahl, 2005; Scarpetta, 1996; Thornton et al., 1997; OECD, 
1996, 1998, 2003). Among the targeted groups are the non-working lone 
parents, disabled people and other benefit claimants for whom benefit 
entitlement is not conditional on availability for work. Recent developments in 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK which required claimants of inactive 
benefits such as lone parents to attend work-focused interviews can be viewed 
as part of such “activation” policies. During these work-focused interviews 
possibilities of work are discussed, job search assistance is provided and 
referrals to training programmes are made but with no obligation claimants to 
take-up job offers.  
 
In addition, some governments introduced radical changes to the structure and 
the management of public employment services (Clasen et al., 2001; Finn, 
2000; Martin, 2000). Such changes involve attempts to integrate the operation 
of agencies responsible for job placement and social assistance services into 
what are described as “one-stop” or “single gateway” agencies (Finn, 2000). 
The aim of such attempts is to improve the effectiveness of labour market 
programmes by creating an integrated gateway to benefit and employment 
services (Finn, 2000; Clasen et al., 2001).  
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Despite the potential benefits of combining these functions under a unified 
agency and extending the activation policies to a wider group of working age 
claimants, such attempts carry some potential risks. First, inappropriate pressure 
may be brought to bear on lone parents and sick and disabled clients. Second, 
there is a risk that attempts at applying activation strategies to inactive benefits 
claimants will divert the energies and resources of the Public Employment 
Services- which are limited, both in terms of staff and in terms of job vacancies- 
away from unemployed people as traditionally defined. Third, organisational 
changes which involve the integration of employment assistance and benefit 
administration services carry the risk that those working in one or other (or 
both) of the previously existing agencies will perceive their services as being 
“taken over”, thereby reducing staff morale and commitment to the service  
(Finn et al., 2005).  
 
It is the latter two issues which are the focus of this paper, and which are going 
to be addressed based on evidence from Jobcentre Plus, the agency which 
started to operate in the UK in April 2002 integrating the service of the pre-
existing Benefits Agency and the Employment Service. Being part of the 
welfare-to-work policy agenda the main aim was to strengthen the link between 
welfare and work for a wide range of working age benefit claimants including 
the unemployed, lone parents, disabled people and carers. Reflecting the work-
focus of the policy, all new and repeat claimants claiming a benefit under the 
administration of Jobcentre Plus are required to attend a work-focused interview 
for their benefit claims to be processed. Unlike the group of unemployed clients 
in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance who already have been part of an intensive 
work-focused service, the changes introduced by Jobcentre Plus significantly 
altered the experience of non-JSA clients such as lone parents and the sick and 
disabled.  
 
Prior the creation of Jobcentre Plus, the integration of the benefit claiming and 
work placements/job-seeking activities was piloted by an agency named ONE. 
ONE operated in 12 areas of Great Britain during the period from June 1999 to 
October 2001. Building upon experience gained by ONE, in October 2001, 56 
Jobcentre Plus Pathfinder offices started to operate in 17 areas of Britain. The 
national implementation of Jobcentre Plus started in April 2002. However, 
because of the magnitude of the associated organisational changes the national 
roll-out of the new organisation is being implemented gradually over a 
transitional period which is planned to end in 2006.  
 
During this transitional period some local offices are fully integrated while for 
others functions remain split between pre-existing Social Security Offices and 
Jobcentres. Benefit claimants are offered the new service provided that they live 
in the areas where integrated Jobcentre Plus offices are operating. For clients 
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not living in such areas the benefit claiming and job placement services remain 
split and are provided by their local Social Security Offices and Jobcentres 
respectively. Jobcentres in such areas provide integrated benefit claiming and 
job-seeking/job placement services for JSA clients only, while for non-JSA 
client groups such as the lone parents and the sick and disabled, benefit services 
are provided by Social Security Offices. In a separate development, since April 
2001 mandatory LPWFI (Lone Parent Work-Focused Interviews) were 
introduced for lone parents claiming Income Support in both integrated and 
non-integrated Jobcentre Plus offices (Knight and Lissenburg, 2005).   
 
The combination of benefit and work-placement/job-seeking activities means 
that the service that the Jobcentre Plus has to deliver is multi-dimensional. On 
the one hand it has to deliver an efficient, accurate and speedy benefit service to 
all benefit claimants as previously the Benefits Agency had to deliver, whereas 
at the same time it has to deliver an efficient work-focused service, increasing 
job entries and the labour market attachment – traditionally an objective of the 
Employment Service. It is obvious that in such a multi-tasking agency the 
service delivery depends on the availability of resources and the importance 
attached to different elements of the Jobcentre Plus service.  
 
Our aim in this paper is to examine the performance of Jobcentre Plus with 
respect to different elements of service delivery. In particular we seek to 
examine its performance with respect to three different elements of service:  
i) job entry outcomes: measuring performance with respect to job entry 
ii) customer service: measuring performance with respect to the general 
standards of service that is provided to customers 
iii) benefit service: measuring the speed and accuracy of the benefit 
claiming process. In the next section we discuss in detail what each of 
these indicators is measuring.  
The hypotheses that we want to test are the following: 
i) Has the integration of benefit claiming and job-seeking activities 
under a unified agency improved job entry outcomes for a wider group 
of claimants i.e. those traditionally classed as inactive? If yes, were 
there any negative effects with respect to job entry outcomes for JSA 
that would suggest that the extension of activation policies to inactive 
benefit claimants diverted energies and resources away from 
unemployed people as traditionally defined? 
ii) Is there any evidence that some elements of service have improved at 
the expense of others?  
The latter hypothesis relates to concerns that have been raised by ex-BA staff 
that the Jobcentre Plus performance targets put an explicit priority to “front 
office” in contrast with the treatment of the “back office” function of benefit 
processing (Johnson, 2003; Finn et al., 2005). The prioritisation of “front 
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office” under the new organisation to a large extent reflects the high importance 
attached to the delivery of an efficient work-focused service. In the context of 
the three elements of service that we examine here, a prioritisation of work-
focused service might increase job entry outcomes whereas it could have 
negative effects on benefit service delivery. The effects on customer service 
depend on the extent to which staff perceive this element of service to be a 
prerequisite for the efficient delivery of the work-focused service. Examining 
Jobcentre Plus performance with respect to different elements of service can 
thus inform us about the extent to which all elements of the Jobcentre Plus 
service are effectively accomplished or whether the work-focus of Jobcentre 
Plus is operating to the detriment of other elements of the service.  
 
Before presenting the results of our testing we review some of the studies 
examining Jobcentre Plus service delivery, we describe briefly the targets upon 
which the performance of Jobcentre Plus is measured and we give details on the 
data and the methods used in our analysis.  
 
Evidence on Jobcentre Plus service delivery 
The Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) has commissioned a series of 
evaluation research projects to monitor the extent to which Jobcentre Plus is 
meeting its service delivery and labour market objectives. At the time of 
writing, DWP has published five research reports based on this evaluation 
research (Lissenburgh and Marsh 2003; Davies et al., 2004; Coleman et al., 
2004; Corkett et al., 2005; McKenna et al., 2005). The various elements of 
Jobcentre Plus service delivery that have been analysed can be categorised 
within the following themes: delivery of the work-focus, customer satisfaction, 
labour market outcomes, office environment, staff safety and fraud. Highly 
relevant to our analysis is the evidence concerning labour market outcomes and 
customer service performance presented in Corkett et al. (2005). Comparing the 
job entry performance of integrated against non-integrated districts, Corkett et 
al. reach the conclusion that integrated Jobcentre Plus offices performed better 
in terms of the total number of job entries for disabled people. However they do 
not find any difference between integrated and non-integrated districts for lone 
parents or for jobseekers. They attribute this lack of difference between 
integrated and non-integrated districts to the fact that for these client groups, 
work-focused interviews are in place in both integrated and non-integrated 
districts (for lone parents the lone parent work-focused interview has rolled out 
nationally in April 2002 while jobseekers have always been required to attend a 
work-focused interview as a condition for the benefit claim). Following a 
similar approach Corkett et al. find that integration had a negative effect on 
customer service. This negative effect however was mainly attributable to the 
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negative transitional effects that were present during the rollout period, with 
performance recovering a few months after the initial rollout. Similarly to 
Corkett et al., we use differences in integrated status in order to examine the 
effects of the Jobcentre Plus service. However, the approach that we followed to 
address our research questions is very different. Corkett et al. define an 
integrated district as any district in which at least one office is integrated. In this 
paper, rather than focusing on differences between integrated and non-
integrated districts, we use the actual level of integration (defined in terms of 
the percentage of offices within districts operating as integrated Jobcentre Plus 
offices) that each district has achieved at each point in time. In addition we 
examine all three elements of the Jobcentre Plus service delivery (job entry, 
customer service and business delivery) providing an overall picture of the 
service delivery. Finally, recognising that the national implementation of 
Jobcentre Plus can be a disruptive process, we present results isolating possible 
negative transitional effects resulting from the implementation of Jobcentre 
Plus.  
 
The Jobcentre Plus targets 
Since 1997, when New Labour came to power the welfare state in the UK has 
undergone significant reforms. These reforms had an explicit welfare-to-work 
orientation and were designed to promote employment, foster inclusion and 
reduce poverty (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2004; Walker and Wiseman, 2003 outline 
and discuss the effectiveness of various welfare reforms introduced under new 
Labour). Jobcentre Plus has been a key element of the reform of the welfare 
state in the UK. Reflecting the ideal  “work for those who can, security for those 
who cannot” (DSS, 1998), which has been central to the New Labour reform of 
the welfare system, the objectives of the new organisation as they are outlined 
in the 2002/03 Annual Report and Accounts (Jobcentre Plus, 2003), are the 
following: 
• to put more benefit recipients in touch with the labour market through the 
intervention of their Personal Adviser 
• to increase sustainable levels of employment by getting more benefit 
recipients into work 
• to ensure that people experience effective and efficient service that is 
tailored to their personal needs 
• to change the culture of the benefit system and the general public towards 
independence and work rather than payments and financial dependence. 
In order to promote the successful delivery of its objectives, a series of targets 
have been set out covering several elements of the Jobcentre Plus service. The 
five components are: Job Entry, Customer Service, Employer Outcome, 
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Business Delivery and Monetary Value of Fraud and Error. Each of these 
targets is briefly outlined below. 
 
The Job Entry Target: 
According to 2003/04 Jobcentre Plus Business Plan each district should achieve 
a total points score of 7,681,000 based on the job entry outcomes that it 
achieves. The job entry target is based on a point system that signals priority 
groups (see Table 1). Each client group and employment programme was 
allocated a point score with highest weight attached to job entries for clients 
from priority groups and programmes. Client groups with highest weights are 
jobless lone parents including people on the New Deal for Lone Parents, those 
on New Deal for Disabled People, people with disabilities in receipt of a 
specified primary benefit and other people in receipt of a specified benefit. 
There are additional scores for:  
• job entries achieved for unemployed customers who live in disadvantaged 
areas, defined on the basis of a high proportion of ethnic minorities or the 
poorest labour market status and low income (2 additional points)  
• Jobseeker Allowance clients who remain off benefit 4 weeks after starting 
the job (1 additional point) (Johnson, 2003). 
 
Table 1: Job entry target point system 2003/04 
Priority Client Group 1: Job entry point score 12 
Jobless Lone Parents including people on the New Deal for Lone Parents 
Those on the New Deal for Disabled People 
People in receipt of a specified primary benefit (Income Support, Incapacity 
Benefit, Severe Disability Allowance, Invalidity Care Allowance and Bereavement Benefit) 
Priority Client Group 2: Job entry point score 8 
People on the New Deal 50 plus 
People on the New Deal 25 plus 
Those on the New Deal For Young People 
Employment Zones 
Other people with Disabilities not included in Priority Client Group 1 
JSA (Jobseeker’s Allowance) long term claimants (over 6 months) 
Priority Client Group 3:Job entry point score 4 
JSA short term claimants (under 6 months) 
Priority Client Group 4:Job entry point score 2 
Unemployed non claimants 
Priority Client Group 5:Job entry point score 1 
Employed people 
Note: Job entry target for 2003/04 was 7,681,000 points  
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The Business Delivery Target: 
The Business Delivery target was designed to ensure that Jobcentre Plus 
undertakes its activities in an efficient and effective manner. This target consists 
of five components: 
• accurate processing of claims of Income Support (assessed by checking a 
sample IS claims),  
• accurate processing of claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance (measured by 
checking a sample of JSA claims), 
• accurate and timely processing of Incapacity Benefit Medical Testing 
decisions (timeliness is measured through IT systems while accuracy is 
assessed by specialised teams for a sample of IB claims) 
• booking appointments and holding interviews with clients and following 
up cases where clients have failed to attend interviews (measured by 
reviewing regionally a sample of cases)  
• identification of people in certain client groups who have literacy, 
language and numeracy skill needs through a face to face screening 
process (measured as the proportion of specific client group that have 
been screened. In 2003/04 the latter component of the Business Delivery 
target changed slightly so that it now measures attendance of a client at 
independent assessment following a basic skill referral. The screening 
element is implicit to this version of the target as it needs to happen 
before a client can be referred for an assessment).  
For 2003/04 the target was that the Jobcentre Plus business processes are 
delivered efficiently, accurately and to the specified standards in 88 per cent of 
the cases checked.   
 
The Monetary Value of Fraud and Error Target: 
This target was set to reduce customer fraud, customer mistake and official 
error. Specialist teams visit each district 3 times a year to examine a number of 
randomly selected IS and JSA cases (Burgess et al., 2003). The target for the 
2003/04 operational year was to reduce losses from fraud and error in working 
age Income Support and Jobseeker Allowance to no more than 6.9 per cent of 
the monetary value of these benefits paid during this year.  
 
Employer Outcome Target: 
The two main indicators making up the employer outcome measure are:  
• resolution, which indicates that the vacancy was filled from any source 
(making up 75% of the whole target) and  
• responsiveness, which indicates whether the vacancy was filled in a 
timescale that met the employers’ need (representing 25% of the target). 
For 2003/04 the target was to achieve a positive outcome for at least 82 per cent 
of employers who place their vacancy with Jobcentre Plus.  
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Customer Service Target:  
The Customer Service target was designed to measure the performance of 
Jobcentre Plus in meeting the standards and commitments outlined in the 
Jobcentre Plus Customer and Employer Charters. The four elements upon which 
it is measured are the following:  
• speed – how quickly staff answer telephone, greet customers and deal 
with customers on the telephone and face to face 
• accuracy – the accuracy of information given over the telephone and face 
to face, 
• proactivity – how well the organisation understands customers’ requests, 
anticipates their needs and how successfully services are tailored to meet 
their individual needs, 
• environment – the quality, facilities, and accessibility of the premises.  
This target is divided into two areas: service to clients (assessed in terms of all 
four elements outlined above) and service to employers (assessed in terms of 
speed, accuracy and proactivity). Service to clients accounts for 75 percent of 
the whole target while service to employers accounts for 25 percent of the 
target. For the client service component performance is assessed by independent 
research companies and is measured via a mystery shopping approach (Burgess 
et al., 2003). For the employers’ service component performance is assessed by 
independent contractors through an employer telephone questionnaire (Burgess 
et al., 2003). For 2003/04 the target was to achieve an 83 per cent customer 
service level in the delivery of the standards set out in the Customers’ and 
Employers’ charters.   
 
Data 
Each year Jobcentre Plus publishes data on performance indicators for each of 
the above listed targets. For our evaluation we use district level performance 
indicators on job entry, customer service and business service for 2002/03 and 
2003/04.  
 
Job entry performance indicators are published on a quarterly basis and are used 
to evaluate the effect of the integrated Jobcentre Plus service on labour market 
outcomes. Two types of data are offered to describe performance with respect to 
job entry:  
• the total job entry points score which is an aggregate indicator of 
performance derived using different weights for job entries achieved for 
different client groups (according to the prioritisation presented in Table 
1) and  
• the actual number of job entries for each client group.  
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We use the absolute number of job entries that was achieved for each client 
group (unemployed, lone parents and disabled people) as a percentage of the 
total number of clients that comprised each group. There are two main reasons 
for choosing job entries as a percentage of the relevant customer base rather 
than using total job entry point score. Firstly, using the percentage of job entries 
for each client group allows us to examine whether Jobcentre Plus had a 
different impact for different client groups (something that would not be 
feasible looking at job entry point score). Secondly, job entry point score does 
not take into account differences in the customer base across districts or within 
districts over time. Thus, relying on job entry point score we would probably 
pick up differences in customer base among districts or within districts over 
time.   
 
Performance indicators with respect to customer service and business delivery 
are used to examine our second hypothesis. Benefit service delivery is examined 
exploiting information on performance for three of the components of the 
business delivery target i) accurate processing of claims for Income Support, ii) 
accurate processing of claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance and iii) accurate and 
timely processing of Incapacity Benefit Medical Testing decisions.1 For 
customer service we use an aggregate indicator summarising the performance 
with respect to all components of the Customer Service target. Similarly to job 
entry, customer service performance data are available on a quarterly basis, 
while the three elements of business delivery target are available on a four-
monthly basis.  
 
Methodology  
As discussed earlier the Jobcentre Plus national rollout has been a gradual 
process which was planned to be implemented in several stages. In April 2002, 
when Jobcentre Plus started to operate, only a limited number of offices offered 
a fully integrated work placement and benefit claiming service. Among the 90 
districts only the 17 Pathfinder districts had any integrated Jobcentre Plus office 
in April 2002.2 The second stage of the national implementation of Jobcentre 
Plus was planned to be implemented between October 2002 and March 2003 
with the rollout of new integrated Jobcentre Plus offices across twenty-four 
                                           
1  Performance data for the job entry and customer service targets are available from the 
Jobcentre Plus website. Data on business delivery and its components were kindly 
provided by Jobcentre Plus Research Division Directorate.  
2  The average number of offices within districts is about 15 offices with a minimum of 
5 and a maximum of 42 offices. 
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districts (some of which included Pathfinder offices). The third (2003/04) stage 
of the roll-out began in April 2003. The planning horizon is that by the end of 
2005/06, new Jobcentre Plus offices will operate in all districts. In the 
meantime, services continue to be provided by local Social Security Offices and 
Jobcentres, which form part of the Jobcentre Plus network but otherwise 
continue to provide the same service that they provided before the introduction 
of Jobcentre Plus.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of districts by degree of integration 
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To provide a graphical description of the integration process Figure 1 shows the 
percentage of districts with different levels of integration for each quarter from 
April 2002 to March 2004.3 As it is evident from this figure in the first quarter 
of 2002/03, the majority of districts had only very few offices offering the 
integrated Jobcentre Plus services. By the end of the observation period (fourth 
quarter of 2003/04) there had been significant increases in the percentage of 
districts with a higher proportion of integrated Jobcentre Plus offices. However, 
even then a high proportion of districts had a relatively low level of integration 
                                           
3  The level of integration of districts is defined as the proportion of offices within 
districts that have been rolled-out as integrated offices by the end of each quarter. To 
construct this measure we used information on dates that offices have been rolled out 
as integrated offices and the total number of offices within districts. Data were kindly 
provided by the Department of Work and Pensions.  
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(in about 49 percent of districts less than 25 percent of offices operate as 
integrated Jobcentre Plus offices). 
 
The gradual roll-out of offices offering the new integrated service can be used 
as a natural experiment to test the effect of integration on the performance 
outcomes. Ideally in order to test the impact of integration upon job entries, 
customer service and benefit service delivery we would need information on 
how changes in the integrated status have affected the performance of individual 
offices. Unfortunately data providing information on performance of individual 
offices are not publicly available. Our testing is therefore based on a series of 
regressions on a dataset that includes quarterly (four monthly) district level 
performance statistics. We include a variable measuring the districts’ integration 
level at the beginning of each quarter (four month period), measured as the 
percentage of offices within district offering the integrated Jobcentre Plus 
services. In addition we include a dummy variable indicating Pathfinder 
districts. Given that Pathfinder districts first piloted the Jobcentre Plus service 
we might expect that they would adjust earlier than other districts to changes.  
 
For each of the performance indicators that we examine here we present results 
from two models. The first is a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
which treats each observation as an independent observation. The second model 
is a fixed effects model which accounts for the fact that there are multiple 
observations per district. The latter model analyses differences within a given 
district over time. Its main advantage is that it differences out any fixed district 
characteristics across the time periods and thus eliminates the heterogeneity 
bias, which may result if there are unobserved district specific effects that may 
affect both  the degree of integration and performance (e.g. having an 
enthusiastic district manager). This may be of particular importance if the 
selection of districts for early integration has not been random.   
 
These are very simple models, focusing attention on how differences in degree 
of integration can account for differences in the performance among districts or 
within districts over time. Due to their simple nature these models explain a 
small proportion of the overall variation. More sophisticated models, using 
more explanatory variables (such as local labour market conditions, and 
measures of staffing levels) would increase their explanatory power, as 
indicated by the R-squared values. Unfortunately, labour market data are not 
available at Jobcentre Plus district level. Nevertheless, these simple models 
provide useful insights for the hypotheses that we seek to test here.  
 
Our approach has several advantages over the one followed by Corkett et al. 
(2005). Firstly, whereas Corkett et al. examine differences in the performance of 
integrated and non-integrated districts (defined in term of whether there are any 
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integrated Jobcentre Plus offices within districts) we test the effect of 
integration taking into account the level of integration within districts (% of 
offices operating as integrated Jobcentre Plus offices). Secondly, our fixed 
effects models allow us to take account of unobserved district level 
characteristics. In particular if those districts selected for a greater degree of 
integration early on in the national roll-out period were not typical of all 
districts, a pooled OLS regression may over or understate the true impact of 
integration on service delivery.   
 
Results 
Job entries  
We begin our analysis by looking at the effects of the level of integration on job 
entry outcomes. The hypothesis that we want to test is whether the integration 
of benefit claiming and job-seeking activities under a unified agency has 
improved job entries. The OLS and fixed effects estimates for the effect of the 
degree of integration on the overall performance with respect to job entry are 
presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: The impact of Jobcentre Plus on job entries outcomes  
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effect 
Integrated status 0.0011 0.0062*** 
Pathfinder 0.116  
Constant      3.595*** 3.567*** 
   
Obs. 720 720 
Number of districts 90 90 
R-squared 0.005 0.003 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Examining first the effect of integration using OLS estimation we find that the 
integrated status variable has no significant effect on job entries. This result 
suggests that districts which are more fully integrated do not achieve higher job 
entries than the less fully integrated districts. In contrast to the pooled OLS 
model, the estimated coefficient on integrated status from the fixed effect model 
suggests that the integrated status has a statistically significant positive effect on 
the job entry outcomes: a 1 percentage point increase in the number of 
integrated Jobcentre Plus offices within a district increases job entries by about 
0.0062 percentage points. The difference in the effects of integrated status 
variable captured by the pooled OLS and fixed effect model is consistent with 
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the idea that there are unobservable differences between integrated and non-
integrated districts. As we discussed earlier, in addition to the integrated status 
variable in the regressions we include a variable indicating districts with 
Pathfinder offices. Although we might expect that Pathfinder districts would 
adjust earlier than other districts to changes given that they first piloted the 
Jobcentre Plus service, the pooled OLS estimators does not suggest that 
Pathfinder districts perform any better than non-Pathfinder districts with respect 
to job entry outcomes. Pathfinder status is time-invariant so it is dropped from 
the FE estimation. 
 
Table 3: The effect of Jobcentre Plus on the job entry outcomes for 
different clients groups 
 Unemployed Lone Parents Sick/disabled 
 OLS Fixed 
Effect 
OLS Fixed 
Effect 
OLS Fixed 
Effect 
Integrated 
status 
0.0022 0.0111*** 0.0022 0.0101*** 0.0041*** 0.0048*** 
Pathfinder 0.53*  -0.02  -0.04  
Constant 9.25*** 9.28*** 3.15*** 3.07*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 
       
Obs. 720 720 720 720 720 720 
Number of 
districts 90 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.008 0.005  0.001 0.151 0.146 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
As stressed by Corkett et al. (2005) the effect of integration should be larger for 
the group of sick and disabled clients and smaller for the jobseekers and lone 
parents – given that for the latter two client groups there is no major difference 
in the intervention regime between integrated and non integrated offices.4  
 
Our results concerning the effect of integration on the job entry outcomes for 
different client groups are presented in Table 3. Similarly to the results 
presented in Corkett et al. (2005), the OLS estimates suggest that the effect of 
integration is significant for the group of the sick and disabled clients while it is 
insignificant for jobseekers and lone parents. However, the fixed effect 
estimates reveal a somewhat different picture: the degree of integration has a 
                                           
4  As discussed earlier the lone parents work-focused interview has rolled out nationally 
in April 2002 while for jobseekers have always been required to attend a work-focus 
interview as a requirement for the benefit claim. 
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significant positive effect on the job entry outcomes for all the three client 
groups with unemployed clients experiencing the highest increase in terms of 
job entry outcomes. For this group the fixed effect estimate on the integrated 
status variable suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the number of 
offices within districts offering the integrated Jobcentre Plus services increases 
job entries by about 0.0111 percentage points. Although Jobcentre Plus has a 
significant positive effect on the job entry outcomes for lone parents and the 
sick and disabled people, the magnitude of the increase for these groups is lower 
than the one we find for jobseekers: the increase implied by the coefficient on 
the integrated status variable is 0.0101 and 0.0048 percentage points for the 
client groups of lone parents and the group of the sick and disabled people 
respectively. Increasing job entries is a positive outcome signalling that the 
integration of benefit claiming, job-seeking and work placement activities under 
a single agency is an effective policy for increasing employment for a wider 
group of benefit recipients. We do not find any support for the conjecture that 
the extension of activation policies to a wider group of inactive benefit 
claimants would have negative effects on the job entries of JSA clients. On the 
contrary, the results of the fixed effect models suggest that as the percentage of 
integrated Jobcentre Plus offices within districts increases the job entries among 
JSA clients increase as well. Differences between the pooled OLS and the fixed 
effect estimates suggest that there are unobservable district effects that affect 
both the level integration and performance. Eliminating these effects using a 
fixed effect model increases the effect of integration level on job entries 
outcomes for all client groups.   
 
Benefit service delivery  
Having examined the impact of Jobcentre Plus on job entry outcomes we now 
turn to investigate its effects on outcomes relating to the delivery of benefit 
services. The hypothesis that we want to test here is whether the emphasis 
attached to the delivery of a more efficient work-focused service has been at the 
expense of benefit service delivery. Table 4 presents results on the effect of 
integrated status on the three components of the business delivery target that 
relate to the accuracy of three different benefit types: JSA, IS, IB (the main 
benefits for the unemployed, lone parents and the disabled people respectively). 
 
For all the three benefits under examination results from both the pooled OLS 
and fixed effect models suggest that higher degree of integration is associated 
with lower accuracy of benefit processing. According to the fixed effects model 
a one percentage point increase in the percentage of integrated offices within the 
district decreases accuracy performance by 0.0337, 0.0393 and 0.0877 
percentage points for JSA, IS and IB benefits respectively. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that the work-focus of the new organisation is to the 
detriment of business delivery.  
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Table 4: The impact of Jobcentre Plus on benefit service delivery  
 JSA accuracy IS accuracy IB Accuracy 
 OLS Fixed 
effect 
OLS Fixed  
effect 
OLS Fixed 
effect 
Integrated 
status -0.0305
** -0.0337** -0.0271** -0.0393*** -0.0671*** -0.0887*** 
Pathfinder   -0.39    1.60***    1.77**  
Constant  92.93***  92.89*** 91.70*** 92.14*** 98.86*** 99.46*** 
       
Obs. 539 539 539 539 485 485 
Number of 
districts 90 90  90 90 90 
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.001 0.053 0.041 
Note: Missing values for the IB accuracy performance for the first two quarters results in a 
significantly lower number of observations for IB accuracy equation.    
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
 
These results concerning the negative impact of integration on business delivery 
have to be treated with caution since they might reflect transitional problems 
caused by disruption and reorganisation following the integration process. The 
possible importance of such transitional effects is reflected in the OLS estimate 
on the variable indicating Pathfinder districts. This estimate suggests that 
Pathfinder districts achieve a better accuracy performance for IS and IB than do 
non-Pathfinder districts.  In the next section we examine the importance of such 
transitional effects more closely by providing results for the integrated status 
after eliminating the importance of transitional effects. 
 
Customer service 
The final performance measure which we examine is customer service (Table 
5). 
  
Given that good customer service is a precondition for the delivery of an 
efficient work-focused service we might except that the work-focus would have 
positive spill-over effects on customer service. Despite its importance, results 
from both OLS and the fixed effect models suggest that integrated status has a 
significant negative effect on customer service. When we eliminate the 
unobserved district effects a 1 percentage point increase in the number of 
offices within districts offering the integrated Jobcentre Plus services is found to 
decrease the customer service performance indicator by 0.0323 percentage 
points. Unlike the results concerning the job entry outcomes, the results on 
customer service suggest that Pathfinder districts achieve a slightly better 
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performance than non-Pathfinder districts lending support to the idea that 
transitional effects may be important.  
 
Table 5: The impact of Jobcentre Plus on customer service  
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effect 
Integrated status -0.0210** -0.0323*** 
Pathfinder 1.105**  
Constant 83.656*** 83.988*** 
   
Obs. 720 720 
Number of districts 90 90 
R-squared 0.0087 0.0191 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Accounting for the importance of transitional effects 
In the analysis of the previous section we have used differences in the 
percentage of offices within districts operating as integrated Jobcentre Plus 
offices in order to investigate the impact of integration on various performance 
indicators. Although differences in the percentage of integrated Jobcentre Plus 
offices provide important statistical information to identify the impact of 
Jobcentre Plus on various performance indicators it may produce misleading 
results if there are negative transitional effects associated with the creation of 
new integrated Jobcentre Plus offices. Such transitional effects are to be 
expected given the large organisational changes that were necessary in order to 
deliver the new service.  
 
In order to disentangle any negative transitional effects, in this section we 
present results from models estimated after eliminating those observations in 
which the degree of integration has changed since the previous observation. 
Basing our estimation on those observations for which the integration status is 
constant for at least one quarter (or in the case of the benefit service delivery 
indicators a four months period) we eliminate the potential negative transitional 
effects associated with the change.   
 
Results from the fixed effects model on job entry and customer service 
outcomes are presented in Table 6. When we eliminate transitional effects 
associated with periods during which new integrated offices have been rolled-
out, the coefficient on integrated status for job entry outcomes increases to 
0.0099 (compared to 0.0062). The increase in the effect of integrated status 
compared to the model that did not account for transitional effects indicates that 
there are indeed negative transitional effects. In contrast to the results presented 
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in Table 4, which indicated that degree of integration had a significant negative 
effect on customer service, the second column of Table 5 suggests that after 
eliminating transitional effects the impact of integrated status variable on 
customer service is insignificant.  
 
Table 6: Fixed effect models estimating the impact of Jobcentre Plus on job 
entries and customer service and benefit service delivery after eliminating 
transitional effects  
 Job entry Customer 
Service 
JSA 
accuracy
IS 
accuracy 
IB 
Accuracy 
Integrated status 0.0099*** 0.0077 -0.0496** -0.0676*** -0.0739*** 
Constant 3.576***     83.872*** 93.11*** 92.13*** 99.33*** 
      
Obs. 657 657 474 474 420 
Number of 
districts 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.020 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
On the other hand, for the benefit service delivery the results presented in Table 
6 suggest that even when we isolate transitional effects, the degree of 
integration has a significant negative effect on performance with respect to each 
of the three benefits under consideration. Thus, for the benefit service delivery, 
the negative effect of integrated status does not seem to be a transitional but 
rather reflect more permanent features of the system.   
 
Discussion  
The importance of integrated management of benefit systems and active labour 
market policies under an agency which combines the three core functions of job 
placement, benefit payments and placing participants on active labour market 
programmes has been widely stressed by international organisations. It is 
argued that combining these functions can extend the activation policies to a 
wider group of working age claimants who otherwise will be difficult to reach. 
Despite the potential benefits of combining benefit and work placement 
activities, such attempts carry the risk that the emphasis put on the delivery of a 
work-focused service will have negative effects on the delivery of the benefit 
service.  
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In this paper we evaluate the impact of integrating the benefit and job seeking 
activities under a unified agency on various aspects of service delivery, based 
on evidence from the Jobcentre Plus which started to operate in the UK in April 
2002. Due to the magnitude of the required organisational change, the rolling-
out of new Jobcentre Plus offices is being implemented gradually. During a 
transitional period which is planned to end by 2006, services are provided by 
new integrated Jobcentre Plus offices as well as by pre-existing local Social 
Security Offices and Jobcentres, which continue to provide the same service 
that they provided before the introduction of Jobcentre Plus. Here we exploited 
changes in the degree of integration within districts over time in order to 
evaluate the impact of the integrated Jobcentre Plus service on three 
performance measures: job entries, customer service and benefit service 
delivery (evaluated in terms of accuracy of three different benefits). Our 
analysis suggests that after eliminating significant transitional effects, the 
integrated Jobcentre Plus service has a clear positive effect on job entry 
outcomes for all client groups while it has neither a positive nor a negative 
effect on customer service outcomes. In line with the argument that the new 
integrated service and the work-focus of the new organisation would have 
negative effects on elements of the service relating to the benefit claiming 
process, we find that the accuracy of processing claims for the JSA, IS and IB 
benefits (the principle benefits for unemployed, lone parents and sick and 
disabled people respectively), are negatively affected by Jobcentre Plus.  
 
Overall our analysis suggests that despite the positive labour market outcomes, 
there is an unmet need for an adequately resourced “back office” functions, in 
order for the benefit service not to be affected negatively by the change and the 
emphasis placed on the delivery of an efficient work-focused service. In 
addition, given the negative transitional effects that we found for Jobcentre Plus 
for job entries and customer service as well as benefit delivery governments and 
policymakers in other countries should take special care when designing multi-
tasking organisations such as Jobcentre Plus to guard against the disruption to 
services associated with major organisational change.  
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